It is a community at once religious and political, and thus its ruler, like the Prophet, was understood to be supreme in both spheres. There could be at Use this link to get back to this page. Jihad and just war. Author: James Turner Johnson. Date: June-July Publisher: Institute on Religion and Public Life. Document Type: Article. Length: 2, words. Translate Article.
Set Interface Language. Decrease font size. Increase font size. Display options. The deployment of U. In Afghanistan, Barack Obama ordered a surge of U.
In , U. At the end of the year, American troops left Iraq. There was, finally, a sense of closure. The fifth phase, from , was the era of transformation, as once again, U. The following year, al-Qaeda repudiated its former affiliate.
But far from collapsing as an organization, ISIS subsequently swept into northern Iraq and declared a global caliphate. Meanwhile, in the often-forgotten war in Afghanistan, American troops were withdrawn and the Taliban made steady gains, with the campaign left teetering between stalemate and failure.
Victory would mean achieving core aims at an acceptable cost relative to the benefits. Al-Qaeda did meet some of its goals: With limited resources, bin Laden gained incredible notoriety and inflicted enormous damage on a great power.
But in a broader analysis, bin Laden failed. Yes, U. Crucially, al-Qaeda was unable to mobilize Muslims around a strict Islamist identity that transcended other loyalties. And national, tribal, and other local identities remain profoundly important from the Palestinians to the Pakistanis. From , confidence in bin Laden collapsed in many Muslim-majority countries, falling from 59 percent to 26 percent in Indonesia, and from 56 percent to 13 percent in Jordan.
In a poll taken in 11 Muslim countries, a median of just 13 percent had a favorable view of al-Qaeda, whereas 57 percent had an unfavorable view. Another key al-Qaeda goal was to assume leadership of the global jihadist movement. Today, al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa and Yemen remain a threat. But history seems to have moved on. Al-Qaeda was a marginal player in the grand drama of the Arab Spring. Al-Qaeda is a loose terrorist network focused on launching spectacular attacks to mobilize Muslims, which sometimes relied on host governments like the Taliban.
ISIS is simultaneously a terrorist network, an insurgency, and a quasi-state, with tens of thousands of fighters , widespread territorial control, and extensive funding. Bin Laden saw the caliphate as a distant goal. In his declaration of war, bin Laden promised that Muslim martyrs would receive 72 pure virgins in heaven.
ISIS offers sex slaves right now. Front-loading the rewards proved popular. By , an estimated one thousand foreign fighters were joining ISIS every month, far in excess of new al-Qaeda recruits. War is not a sports match where one team wins and the other team loses. Instead, each side has its own separate tally.
But a sober assessment of the last 20 years suggests that the United States lost the broader war. But Americans have paid an exorbitant price for the two-decade campaign in strategic, economic, and moral terms. Austria-Hungary used the attack as a pretext for war against Serbia, triggering a cataclysmic conflict, World War I, in which four empires collapsed—the Russian, German, Ottoman, and Austria-Hungarian.
Recounting the costs is numbing: over 7, Americans killed, tens of thousands of soldiers seriously wounded, trillions of dollars expended, and over , civilian deaths in Iraq alone.
ISIS is an even more ruthless and capable adversary. If we consider the United States on defense, the success of the homeland-security complex in making Americans safer is highly debatable. A trillion dollars has poured into counter-terrorism programs, but to what end? There have been some genuine payoffs.
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